I'm a bit paranoid about these, but having tickets with active RSAA, I changed the passwords assigned to SM both for their administrative webmail and for RDP access.You never know. That said, I've been quiet these days, but I really think it's absolutely wrong to point the finger at SM. There is no secure software, whether for large or small organizations. I'm still burned by a bad intrusion due to a bug on the MS sql server many years ago. I have learned over time that you always have to be ready for the worst, but it is certainly not the fault of the supplier on duty. I think SM is doing a great job, but we are talking about a very widespread service that is exposed to the public. The fact that there are few times, if not the first one to be discussed, shows the great work done by SM. Instead, I am amazed at the lack of attention of some administrators, ready to attack SM, but then to discover that they had no restrictions on the admin, IP, or 2FA. Forgive me, but I find it absurd. I had the pass reset in the very first days of this story, but checking the logs at hand, besides resetting it, they couldn't do anything else, because there were IP and 2FA restrictions. They tell me I'm being excessive, but I want to be as safe as possible. In addition to network security, trying to respect what Zero Trust Architecture is as much as possible, the rest are backups.
1) Once a day vm backup (same farm on the hypervisor)
2) Every 6 hours, all data via acronis with 7-day retention and immutable at 14 days (in a different provider both administratively and geographically)
3) Every day, the entire VM via Acronis with 14-day retention and immutable at 14 days (in a provider that is both administratively and geographically different from the one in point 2)
4) Data backup every day via Ahsay Backup with 30-day retention (through a different provider than points 2 and 3 and repositories in 2 distinct European areas)
All backups are obviously encrypted and access to the respective consoles is protected by 2fa
After the story of the OVH fire, I don't trust anyone. (I wasn't in that farm, but those who didn't have secondary backups are still crying)
Call me crazy, but I want to be as calm as possible.
This backup policy allows me to recover the entire status of a customer's mailbox in 6-hour increments (obviously, such a request requires a fee).
I've often tried to encourage SM to include a Shadow Copy-related feature that would allow users to independently see what their mailbox looked like on a specific date (a sort of time machine). That would be fantastic... but now I digress.
I wish everyone success in overcoming this difficult time.